



Los Angeles ranks as the city with the worst air
quality in the u.s. To address this problem, the
South COc1stAif Quality Management District
recently released its plan to bring the air quality
in the Los Angeles Basin into compliance with
the standards of the Clean Air Act by the year
2007. The prescriptions set forth in the plan will
require significant changes in the lifestyles and
behavior of L.A. residents and businesses.
Market-based solutions to air pollution are
curiously absent in the plan. In nearly all cases,
the plan calls for restricting various practices by
law and regulation, rather than emphasizing fees
related to the cost burden imposed by polluting
activities. This Letter discusses the economics
of the air pollution problem and suggests that
market-based solutions likely would achieve the
desired improvement in air quality at consider-
ably lower cost and with less disruption to the
L.A. economy.
The extent of the problem
The Air Quality Management Plan (AQMP)
identifies seven major categories of air pollution:
carbon monoxide, lead, nitrogen dioxide, ozone,
sulfate, sulfur dioxide, and PM10 (suspended par-
ticulate matter less than 10 microns in diameter).
In 1987, Los Angeles exceeded federal and state
standards for ozone, carbon monoxide, PM10,
and nitrogen dioxide. The maximum concentra-
tions of ozone, carbon monoxide, and PMlO
were between 1.8 and three times the amount
permitted by federal and state air quality
standards.
Moreover, the situation is expected to worsen.
L.A:s population is expected to expand at an
annual rate of 1.3 percent between 1985 and
2010, increasing from 11.3 million to 15.5 million
people. Although existing restrictions are ex-
pected to reduce several types of pollution from
current levels by as much as nine percent, popu-
lation growth likely will contribute to an increase
in other types of pollution. For example, sulfur
oxides and PM10 concentrations are projected to
rise by 16 and 47 percent, respectively, between
1985 and 2010. Clearly, additional measures are
needed if L.A. is to accommodate the increased
population and still control air pollution.
TheAQM plan
The South Coast AQMP represents a comprehen-
sive effort to curb pollution-generating practices
by all residents of the L.A. basin-businesses, as
well as households. The plan relies primarily on
regulatory solutions. It establishes three tiers of
regulations based on: (1) existing technology, (2)
technology that is about to be implemented, and
(3) technology that is believed to be possible by
the turn ofthe century.
Detailed restrictions are left to local jurisdictions,
but the plan makes recommendations for such
restrictions. Recommended regulations governing
individuals include restrictions on the use of
aerosol products and lighter fluid for outdoor
grilling,the types of paints and coatings that can
be used, and eventually, the types of vehicles
that can be operated. Restrictions on businesses
includelimits on bakeries, dry cleaning estab-
lishments, and manufacturers and users of paints,
along with requirements aimed atincreasing car
pooling and changing work hours.
The economics of pollution
As an alternative to the regulatory approach
taken by the AQMP, economists have argued that
pollution can be controlled through economic
incentives. They suggestthat the pollution
problem arises because private parties currently
do not have any inducement toconsider the
"social" costs of activities that cause pollution.
The social cost of an activity is the sum of all the
costs imposed on everyone who is affected by
that acti\iity.
For example, a person driving a car emitting
carbon monoxidemay alter his or her driving
habits based on personal concerns about the
increased health risk associated with the emis-
sion. However, the social cost in this case is
much larger than the increased risk to the driver
because other people also are affected by thatFRBSF
emission. Since these larger social costs are not
factored into the driver's decision, the driver may
use the car more than is desirable from society's
perspective.
When social and private costs diverge like
this, the problem can be solved by charging the
polluter for the costs imposed on others or by
having those affected by the pollution pay the
polluter to reduce pollution. Either way, polluters
will have incentives to find the least-cost means
of reducing the pollution created by their
activities.
In some cases, market forces will generate
institutions, such as private contracts and
lawsuits, to bring about a more socially desirable
solution. Such private arrangements arise when
the information about the social costs of individ-
ual actions is readily available, polluters are
easily identified, and property rights are clearly
defined and protected by law. For example,
problems with noise pollution often meetthese
requirements and can be resolved through
private arrangements.
For most types of pollution, however, neither
the polluters nor the costs to all affected parties
can be easily or costlessly identified. Moreover,
property rights frequently are poorly defined and
therefore not well protected by the law. Air pollu-
tion is a case in point on all three counts. As a
result, without assistance, private markets are
less able to devise arrangements to achieve the
desired solution.
Public solutions
In practice, then, pollution abatement decisions
often are delegated to public agencies because
the cost of getting all affected individuals to
enter into private contracts is prohibitive. To
address the problem, these agencies typically
begin by establishing allowable limits for pol-
lutants based on scientific evidence or expert
testimony. They then design policies to bring
pollution levels within these standards.
In most cases, policy makers and planners favor
a regulatory approach to pollution abatement, as
is evident in the AQMP. The advantageof this
approach is that it has the appearance of being
even-handed. Activities can be restricted by law
without regard to the personal characteristics of
those engaged in that activity; all persons are
equally restricted. Moreover, the regulatory
approach appeals because it is direct.
The pricing approach
The alternative approach to pollution abatement
attempts to "internalize" the social costs associ-
ated with pollution-producing activity through
fees, taxes and/or subsidies. This pricing ap-
proach relies on decentralized decisions. Rather
than applying restrictions across the board, it
encourages individuals and firms to minimize
their polluting activities selectively, taking into
account differences in the cost of compliance,
such as higher production costs, lower produc-
tion, and/or reduced employment.
Because these compliance costs can vary signifi-
cantly across individuals and firms, strategies
that change economic incentives usually are less
costly to society than regulatory strategies. By
requiring the same diminution in pollution from
all, the regulatory approach has the potential to
impose tremendous costs on certain individuals
and firms. Pricing mechanisms, in contrast, allow
individuals and firms to choose the least-cost
strategies: either paying the fee or adjusting
behavior so as to reduce pollution and avoid the
fee. Pricing also encourages the individuals and
firms that can reduce pollution cheaply to do
even more than their "share!'
Another advantage is that pricing solutions tend
to be easier to link directly to the problem. New
charges can be levied on the basis of actual
emissions and, in fact, should be linked to the
best estimates of the costs of the pollution. In
contrast, regulations often rely on existing tech-
nological links to the final emissions and ban or
require certain processes. For example, scrubbers
may be required for smokestacks, even though
the firm may be able to reduce emissions at
lower cost by changing fuels or other production
processes.
Pollution-fee approaches also have the advantage
that they generate revenue. Regulatory strategies
may involve the imposition of fines for non-
compliance, but such fines by definition are
employed only in extraordinary circumstances,
and neither serve a pricing function nor generate
much revenue. These fee revenues can be used
for direct investment in pollution abatement, or
as compensation to persons continuing to suffer
from the pollution.This gives the fee approach the potential to be
not only more efficient, but also more equitable
than regulations. Although fees often are consid-
ered unfair to the poor (because wealthy persons
can pay to continue polluting while the poor
cannot afford to do so), that need not be the case.
Revenues can be redistributed to offset undesir-
able income effects. For example, when auto-
mobile registration fees are tiedto exhaust
emissions, older cars, which tend to have higher
emissions, face higher fees. Although this could
lead to a disproportionate burden on some low-
income drivers, the burden can be offset by
using the revenues raised by the emission fees to
finance emission-system upgrades, transit service
improvements, or even an offsetting tax credit.
It is important to note that regulations generate
virtually no revenues to facilitate such adjust-
ments. Indeed, the regulatory approach often
calls for more taxes on top of the regulations to
achieve such ends.
Finally, pollution-fee approaches actually are
more equitable when viewed properly. The fees
simply force the polluter to pay the full social
cost of a particular action. In the absence of a
fee, the cost is implicitly imposed on those not
causing the pollution.
Arole for prices in the AQMP
As noted above, price incentives and market-
oriented inducements virtually are ignored in the
AQM plan. The plan does include fees for down-
town parking which may discourage driving;
however, planners usually opted for regulations.
The analysis presented in this Letter suggests that
this regulatory orientation will increase the social
and economic costs of compliance. In nearly all
cases, more cost-effective economic incentives
could be devised as substitutes for the regula-
tions. Two examples illustrate this point. The
AQMP restricts the types of paints and coatings
that can be applied. Alternatively, a series of fees
could be imposed to increase the cost of using
coatings that create excessive pollution relative
to the cost of using other, less polluting types of
coatings. In this way, the use of pollution-causing
coatings would be discouraged, and those that
continue to use such coatings for lack of a sub-
stitute coating would pay for the pollution they
generate. Moreover, the higher after-tax price
paid by those that cannot switch would encour-
age coatings manufacturers to generate non-
polluting substitutes.
In the case of automobile emissions, the AQMP
calls for a wide variety of regulatory changes that
include switching to alternative fuels, establish-
ing high occupancy vehicle lanes, and requiring
firms to increase the average occupancy of cars
parking in their lots. Many of the technologies
necessary for this transition currently are not
feasible, and the economic incentives to encour-
age their development are minimal.
In contrast, fees based on a vehicle's emissions
and mileage offer immediate incentives to driver~
to reduce unnecessary driving and to operate
less polluting vehicles. By linking the amount
of pollution to the cost of driving, drivers are
encouraged to reduce their driving. Moreover,
because pollution-based registration fees would
be higher for cars that cause more pollution (in
contrast to the current approach of higher fees for
newer, less polluting cars), these fees would
encourage a transition to less-polluting vehicles.
Importantly, the fees would provide a source of
revenues to administer and finance the program.
Alot at stake
Pricing strategies will not eliminate the cost
bu'rden of pollution abatement, but they will
ensure that pollution abatement is achieved in
the most cost-effective way. Choosing the right
fee or subsidy to achieve this goal is difficult, but
so is determining the appropriate regulation. In
either case, some lack of compliance can be ex-
pected. Consumers can avoid a gas tax by buying
outside the jurisdiction, for example. But the
problems with compliance probably would be
considerably less under pricing than under a
regulatory approach.
Because the burden of meeting the standards
of the Clean Air Act will be large and requires
many changes in the behavior of individuals
and firms, choosing least-cost strategies will be
important. Economic theory suggests that the
least-cost solution relies on market-based incen-
tives. Final decisions regarding the proposed
AQM plan, therefore, should carefully consider
the inclusion of pricing strategies as a means of
reducing the burden of compliance.
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